Evaluating Accomplice and Approver Testimony in Murder Prosecutions

Panel: Riaz Ahmad, J.

This criminal appeal, No. 473 of 1985, decided on July 9, 1986, involved Tariq and others as Appellants against The State as the Respondent. The core legal issues revolved around the interpretation of an “approver” and “accomplice” under the Evidence Act and their testimony in a murder case (Sections 302, 148 & 149 of the Penal Code). The court defined an approver as a person who tries to exculpate himself and lacks mens rea, while an accomplice must be a conscious participator in the crime, a guilty associate, or consciously connected with the offense before, during, or after its commission. A witness not concerned with the crime cannot be treated as an accomplice. The court emphasized that a conviction cannot be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver. While an accomplice is a competent witness, their evidence requires corroboration in material particulars, preferably from an independent source, especially when the approver has concealed facts or shown a propensity for perjury. The court cited various precedents to highlight these principles, including the Supreme Court’s stance that corroboration must directly connect the accused with the commission of the crime.

Applying these principles, the court found the prosecution’s case against the appellants highly suspicious. The statement of the approver, Mumtaz, was deemed inconsistent and not inspiring confidence, particularly because he did not clearly state who was responsible for the fatal injuries. There were also discrepancies regarding the time and place where the alleged conspiracy was hatched. The fact that two of the appellants were arrested three days before the approver’s statement was recorded cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s narrative. Furthermore, the court noted the absence of a clear motive for the appellants, who were from a different social standing, to kill the deceased, a poor sweets vendor. Given the lack of corroboration for the approver’s testimony and the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted.

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